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Investigations and other early writings. In section 1, I attempt to capture the core of 
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the account of intentional relation developed in the fifth Investigation. In section 3, 
I try to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the sixth Investigation that the des-
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how he addresses the problem of non-existents. In section 6, I argue that a phe-




Husserl  Intentionality  Relations  Properties  Existence  Mereology 
 
                                                             
† The first version of this paper was presented at NASEP 2017 Conference At the Origins of Phenomeno-
logy: Logic, Psychology, Ontology (Seattle University, June 2, 2017), with the title ‘Object’ as a Functional 
Concept. On Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality. Many thanks to George Heffernan, Stefania Centrone, 
Matt Bower and Chad Kidd for the comments. I owe special thanks to Daniele De Santis, who commen-
ted extensively on this version. A second version was presented at the Workshop of FWF Project P-
27215 Consciousness and Intentionality. Brentano, Husserl, and Beyond (University of Salzburg, October 9, 
2017), with the title Husserl and Relational Intentionality. I’d like to thank Hamid Tayeb and Denis Fisette 
for their comments. Special thanks to Guillaume Fréchette, who commented extensively on this version. 





What prompted Husserl’s inquiry into the nature of intentionality is well known: from 
Brentano he inherits the idea that a crucial task of philosophy is to focus on experi-
ences,1 which according to the Brentanian view are necessarily intentional; from Bol-
zano he inherits the burden of dealing with the issue of ‘objectless presentations’―an 
issue that by focusing on non-existent objects presents a problem for intentionality in 
general. Brentano’s teaching and Bolzano’s problem drove him to clarify the relation-
ship among experience, intentionality, and existence. The principal goal of this paper 
is to discuss Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it appears in Logical Investigations and 
in other early writings. My contribution aims at being both exegetical and systematic. 
My main exegetical thesis is that Husserl’s early theory of intentionality cannot be read 
as a non-relational theory of intentionality; in particular, it cannot be read as a sort of 
adverbialism. The interpretation I will defend is a minority one, for Husserl’s theory 
of intentionality is mostly taken as a non-relational theory (see Süßbauer 1995; Crane 
2006; Erhard 2009; Künne 2011), and more specifically as a case of adverbial theory 
(see Erhard 2009; Chrudzimski 2015). My main systematic thesis is that a phenomeno-
logical theory of intentionality grounded in Husserl’s insights cannot be a non-rela-
tional theory of intentionality. 
Before beginning I should make two philological remarks. First, I will not take into 
account Husserl’s 1894 essay Intentionale Gegenstände, in which a solution to Bolzano’s 
issue is developed which is peculiar and quite different to the one presented in Logical 
Investigations (see Fréchette 2009; Erhard 2014, pp. 213–257). Nevertheless, I will quote 
from this essay, for two reasons: because I think it contains insights which turn out to 
be important for the theory of intentionality presented in Investigations; and because 
some interpreters argue that the two works permit the same reading―which is pre-
cisely the position I will argue against.  
Secondly, the edition of Logical Investigations I will be examining is the second one, 
which is subsequent to Ideas I. However, even though I will consider texts which were 
written after Ideas I, I will not discuss the notion of ‘noema’; this notion is so complex 
and controversial that it deserves a separate paper. All that I will do is to point to those 
passages from Husserl’s early writings that in my view contain Husserl’s conception 
of noema in nuce. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I will present Husserl’s 
early concept of intentionality in its main features. I will attempt to capture its core by 
identifying three basic theses (which will become more and more clear along the way) 





depend upon veridicality. The second section is devoted to a detailed analysis of the 
account of the intentional relation developed in the 5th  Logical Investigation (henceforth: 
‘5th LI’, and likewise for the other Investigations). First, I will argue that in Husserlian 
ontology a proposition such as ‘Every intentional experience has an object’ should be 
considered analytic; and second, I will address the issue using contemporary notions 
of property. In the third section, I will try to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the 
6th LI that the designation ‘object’ is a relative one. In the fourth section, I will examine 
Husserl’s conception of intentionality in light of the mereology outlined in the 3rd LI. 
In the fifth section, I will explain how Husserl criticizes the so-called theory of imma-
nent objects (mainly developed by Twardowski) and how he addresses the problem 
of non-existents (a reformulation of the above-mentioned issue). I will there challenge 
the reading defended by Alfons Süßbauer (1995) and Wolfgang Künne (2011) and clar-
ify Husserl’s concept of existence. In the final section, I will argue that a phenomeno-
logical theory of intentionality grounded on Husserl’s insights cannot be a non-rela-
tional one. In this regard, I will also compare Husserl’s account with the adverbial 
account and the parametric account. 
 
1   The concept of intentionality 
 
It is widely accepted that it is in Logical Investigations that Husserl developed his most 
sophisticated theory of intentionality. Nevertheless, some disagree. Süßbauer (1995, p. 
96) for example has claimed that in that work Husserl tried to clarify the concept of 
intentionality by using metaphorical (hence improper) language. Heffernan (2015, p. 82) 
by contrast holds that Husserl’s discussion of the concept at issue is a scientific one, 
that is, a discussion conducted in proper language. In the following, I aim at showing 
that Süßbauer is wrong and that Heffernan is right. In my view, the core of the theory 
of intentionality developed in Logical Investigations and other early writings can be 
summarized in three basic theses:  
 
[H1] Intentionality is a property. 
[H2] Intentionality entails a relation. 
[H3] Intentionality does not depend upon veridicality. 
 
Let me briefly introduce them one by one. 
[H1]. In the 5th LI, Husserl states that the qualifying adjective ‘intentional’ designates 





which is defined as something that entails a reference to something else in the mode 
of presentation (Vorstellung) or in an analogous way.2 This allows us to formulate the 
following definition: an intentional experience (or act) is nothing other than an experi-
ence through which we present something. More formally, we can say that an experi-
ence E is intentional if and only if through E we present something. For example, if 
through an experience E we present a laptop, then E is intentional. 
[H2]: Husserl stresses the point that in developing a theory of intentionality the con-
cept of relation (Beziehung) turns out to be unavoidable: if an experience is intentional, 
then through that experience we refer to (sich beziehen) or direct ourselves to (sich richten) 
something.3 Even though in Husserl’s texts there are no such fine-grained distinctions, 
it can be stated that the categories of relation and direction are not equivalent: every 
direction is a relation, but not every relation is a direction. Thus, it can be said that 
intentionality is a property which entails a directional relation. Following Paśniczek 
(1996), I would like to describe intentionality using some notions of basic geometry. 
Here a direction is determined by any two points a and b. Point a stands for the intend-
ing subject, point b for the object. However, intentionality entails a direction with a 
certain orientation; this is why we represent it with an arrow. Indeed, intentionality has 
a definite orientation: from the intending subject to the object, but not vice versa. 
Such a description permits a preliminary demarcation of the notion of object. As 
Husserl writes in his lecture course from 1902, Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie, what we 
term ‘object’ is the target (Zielpunkt) of the experience (see Husserl 1902, p. 136). Thus, 
in our drawing, what indicates the object cannot be any point between a and b, for what 
we term ‘object’ is what the intending subject aims at; in other words, the object is by 
definition the final point. Such a description is mirrored on the etymological level: as 
Husserl himself points out in his 1898 treatise Abhandlung über Wahrnehmung, the Ger-
man word Gegenstand means ‘something which stands in front of (something else)’.4 
[H3]: In the lecture course from 1908, Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre, Husserl 
writes that every presentation must have an object, and it does not matter if the con-
viction (Überzeugung) is right (richtig) or not.5 ‘Conviction’ can be read as what in the 
5th LI is more technically called positional quality. The nexus between positionality and 
veridicality is quite clear: if an intentional experience E is veridical, then the positional 
quality which belongs to E is right. More precisely, if a perception P is veridical, then 
the belief which belongs to P is right. That a perception P is veridical entails that the 
object of P is real; for example, if my perception of the laptop is veridical, then the 





2   The intentional relation 
 
In the 5th LI a seemingly simple question is posed: what does it mean to say that some-
thing is intended? According to Husserl, it means just that an intentional experience is 
present (präsent). Husserl expands on his answer as follows: if (i) “an intentional expe-
rience is present (präsent),” then (ii) “an intentional relation is eo ipso carried out,” and 
(iii) “an object is eo ipso ‘intentionally gegenwärtig’.”6 Since Husserl states that (i), (ii), 
and (iii) say the same thing, it is tempting to conceive of präsent and gegenwärtig as 
equivalent. However, this is not the case: as Husserl himself emphasizes, the fact that 
we present something (or that something is presented) does not imply that an object is 
präsent, but only that an experience is präsent. By contrast, if we present something (or 
if something is presented), then, necessarily, an object is gegenwärtig. As I will show, all 
this is perfectly consistent with the view about existence we will find in the appendix 
to the 5th LI―a view which is already fully developed in the 1898 treatise (see section 
5) and which substantiates [H3]. For all these exegetical reasons, I conclude that in this 
context, präsent can be replaced by ‘existent’, whereas gegenwärtig cannot. Thus, (i), (ii), 
and (iii) can be rephrased as follows: 
 
(i+) An intentional experience exists. 
(ii+) An intentional relation exists. 
(iii+) Something is an object. 
 
Note that both of the following would be incorrect (or at least misleading) rewordings 
of (iii):  
 
(iii~) An object exists. 
(iii~) There is an object. 
 
This is because the early Husserl uses ‘There is […]’ and ‘[…] exists’ as stylistic vari-
ants. This is what we read in the essay from 1894, Intentionale Gegenstände, where he 
declares that the propositions ‘there is an A’ and ‘A exists’ have the same domain.7 
Asserting that (i+), (ii+), and (iii+) say the same thing is tantamount to asserting that 
(i+), (ii+), and (iii+) are extensionally equivalent. This means, for example, that if we 
state (i+), then we state (iii+) implicitly. All this complies with Husserl’s way of speak-
ing in the key passages of the 5th LI, where he frequently writes: ‘If I present X, then X 





Interestingly, if we look at the account of the analytic–synthetic dichotomy that 
Husserl develops in §11 of the 3rd LI (which is quite different from the one developed 
in §12 of the same Investigation), a proposition such as (a) ‘Every intentional experience 
has an object’ turns out to be analytic (provided that there is no third way between the 
analytic and the synthetic). In fact, in the passage quoted above, the Latin locution eo 
ipso is paraphrased as ‘according to its own essence’ (an seinem eigenen Wesen), which 
is the same expression Husserl uses to describe the relation between pleasure and what 
is pleasant: the essence (or concept) of pleasure demands a relation to the essence (or 
concept) of what is pleasant. To make this clearer, compare (a) with the paradigmatic 
case of a synthetic (a priori) proposition we find in the 3rd LI: (b) ‘Every colour is ex-
tended.’ In this case, Husserl says that the essence (or concept) of colour does not de-
mand a relation to the essence (or concept) of extension; hence this proposition is not 
analytic.8 Even though it seems that Husserl denies that pleasure and what is pleasant 
are correlatives (Korrelativa), I maintain that the intending subject and the object should 
be considered correlatives. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain 
why Husserl speaks of an ‘intentional correlation’. But note that the claim ‘An intending 
subject is unthinkable without an object (and vice versa)’ should not be rephrased as 
‘A subject intends X if and only if there is an X’ or ‘A subject intends X if and only if X 
exists,’ but rather as ‘A subject intends X if and only if X is an object.’9 
 
3   ‘Object’ as a relative designation 
 
There are two properties that we usually associate with a dyadic relation (see Casari 
2009, pp. 53–54). Take for example the following proposition: (A) ‘A love relation ob-
tains between Paris and Helen,’ where ‘to obtain’ must be considered a synonym of ‘to 
exist’ (here and henceforth). Now, (A) entails both (B) ‘Paris has the property of loving 
Helen’ and (C) ‘Helen has the property of being loved by Paris.’ These properties are 
called relational properties. Let us apply this schema to Husserl’s account of intention-
ality. Consider another proposition which expresses a dyadic relation: (A') ‘An inten-
tional relation obtains between Paris and a leaf.’ Again, (A') entails both (B') ‘Paris has 
the property of intending a leaf’ and (C') ‘A leaf has the property of being intended by 
Paris.’ As I said, the properties expressed in (B') and (C') are relational, but both (B') 
and (C') imply that there exists an experience which has the property of intentionality. 
It is not easy to categorize this property: does ‘intentional’ also express a relational 





part. Thus, it can be stated: x is a mereological property of y if and only if x is a part of 
y. A Husserlian instance of a mereological property is green: if x is said to be green, 
then green is a part of x. I shall leave my question open; I will state only that if ‘inten-
tional’ expresses a mereological property, then, by definition, ‘intentional’ will desig-
nate a part of an experience. I shall call relational properties ‘R-properties’ and mere-
ological properties ‘M-properties’. Thus, both ‘intending something’ and ‘being in-
tended by someone’ express R-properties. 
Such a schema conforms with Husserl’s notion of ‘object’. In the 6th LI we read that 
the designation ‘object’ is a relative one, namely, a designation which expresses a rela-
tion. This means that it does not designate a ‘mark’ (Merkmal)―an expression which in 
the 3rd LI is a synonym of ‘part’ (see Husserl 1901, pp. 31, 198, 666 and 680).10 Husserl’s 
definition of ‘part’ is quite simple. In the 3rd LI two versions of it are provided: accord-
ing to the first, x is a part of y if and only if x is really in y; according to the second, x is 
a part of y if and only if y really has x. It is clear that the second definition is simply a 
rewording of the first. Using my example, I can say that ‘object’ does not designate 
something that is really in the leaf or that the leaf really has. That X is an object means 
rather that X is the intentional correlate of an experience (or alternatively, that X is pre-
sented). Hence, in Husserl’s view, ‘object’ is a designation which expresses an R-prop-
erty. This point can be clarified using the comparison Husserl makes: ‘representative’ 
does not express an M-property of the sensation, for the existence of the mere sensation 
is not sufficient for the sensation to be designated ‘representative’; the existence of an 
apprehension is also necessary. Analogously, ‘object’ does not express an M-property 
of the leaf, for the existence of the leaf is not sufficient for the leaf to be designated an 
‘object’; the existence of an intentional experience is also necessary. In other words, 
just as it is not an M-property of the sensation of green to be a representative of a green 
thing, because the sensation of green is not representative just by virtue of itself, so it is 
not an M-property of the leaf to be the object of an intentional experience, because the 
leaf is not an object just by virtue of itself. To be sure, just as ‘being an object’ does not 
designate a part of the leaf, so ‘being green’ does not designate a part of the leaf (see 
Husserl 1901, p. 666). Nevertheless, while ‘object’ does not designate a part of the leaf 
(i.e. it does not express an M-property of the leaf), ‘green’ does designate a part of the 
leaf (i.e. it expresses an M-property of the leaf): I can say that the green is really in the 
leaf or that the leaf really has the green. 
This is also descriptively (that is, phenomenologically) grounded. Let us assume that 





should be, for example, perceivable―implicitly through a partial intention (Partialinten-
tion) and explicitly through a particular perception (Sonderwahrnehmung). We could 
intend it as we do in the case of colours. But Husserl would hold that this is unsound. 
Consequently, the sentence ‘We intend an object’ is also imprecise, for we intend some-
thing (e.g., a leaf), which therefore is an object. 
 
4   Mereology and intentionality 
 
Recall the answer Husserl gives in the 5th LI: that something is intended means just 
that an intentional experience is present (präsent). As I said, we can paraphrase the 
second part of the answer as follows: ‘An intentional experience exists.’ Husserl urges 
us not to misunderstand his answer. According to him, two wrong readings are likely: 
 
(1) For every intentional experience E: we live through (erleben) E and the object of E. 
(2) For every intentional experience E: E is to its object either as a whole is to one of its parts 
or as a part is to its whole. 
 
By rejecting (1) Husserl denies that the level of experience coincides with the level of 
objects: indeed, (1) is untenable because it is true only in case of reflection, often called 
by Husserl ‘immanent perception’.11 In the case of intentional experiences such as 
transcendent perceptions or their intentional modifications (remembering and phan-
tasy), it is not: if we perceive a laptop, we do live through the perception of the laptop, 
but we do not live through the laptop itself. Analogously, if we remember the laptop, 
we do live through the remembering of the laptop, but we do not live through the 
laptop itself. 
By evoking (2), Husserl implicitly asserts that in the discussion of intentionality, 
mereology must be taken into account. In this regard two relationships must be con-
sidered: the relationship between the intentional experience and intentionality, and the 
relationship between the intentional experience and the object. Concerning the first, I 
left the issue open: if intentionality were an M-property of an experience, then, by def-
inition, intentionality would be a part of that experience. What is certain is that inten-
tionality is a peculiar property, since it can entail a relationship between a whole W 
(the experience) and something which is not a part of W. Thus, while the first relation-
ship would subsist necessarily between a whole W and a part of W, the second one does 





for an immanent intentional experience; it is not true for a transcendent one. The ex-
ample of a transcendent act we find in the 5th LI is the presentation of the god Jupiter 
(see Husserl 1901, p. 386), but it can be said that the paradigmatic case of a transcend-
ent act in Husserl’s investigations is outer perception. 
In the lecture course from 1904, Über Wahrnehmung, Husserl develops the following 
two arguments in order to justify the transcendence of the object of outer perception:12 
 
[Arg1] If the object of outer perception were to the perception as a part is to its whole, then 
the real existence of outer perception would entail the real existence of its object. But 
its object can be unreal; thus, the object of outer perception cannot be a part of it. 
 
[Arg2] If the object of outer perception were to the perception as a part is to its whole, then 
different outer perceptions would have different objects. But different outer percep-
tions can have the same object; thus, the object of outer perception cannot be a part 
of it. 
 
So even if we are allowed to say that an outer perception P has an object―meaning by 
this simply that through P we refer to something―we cannot say that P really has an 
object; analogously, even if we are allowed to say that the object of P is in P―meaning 
by this simply that the object is the intentional correlate of P―we cannot say that the 
object of P is really in P. For if it were the case the object of P is a content (Inhalt) of P in 
the proper sense, it would be a part of it. 
Note that in both [Arg1] and [Arg2] there is an implicit premise, which in both cases 
is an analytic law. [Arg1] follows from the law according to which the existence of the 
whole entails the existence of (all of) its parts (see Husserl 1901, 260). [Arg2] follows 
from the law according to which different wholes are distinct wholes, and parts of dis-
tinct wholes are distinct entities (and hence numerically distinguishable entities). 
[Arg1] is based on the case of hallucination: if we hallucinate a laptop, then our halluci-
nation is real, whereas the laptop is unreal. [Arg2] is based on the case of the manifold: 
if we turn the laptop around and see it from various sides, we live through different 
visual perceptions which have the same object. 
At this point I can state that Husserl rejects two theses, which are exactly the two 
disjuncts that appear in (2): 
 
[M1] For every intentional experience E: E is to its object as a whole is to one of its parts. 






I have already explained why, according to Husserl, [M1] is untenable. [M2] is patently 
counterintuitive. However, a third conception is still available: 
 
[M3] For every intentional experience E: E is to its object as a part x of a whole W is to a part 
y of W. 
 
One could hold that [M3] is a correct description of intentionality; more specifically, 
one could hold that for every intentional experience E, E is to its object as a moment x 
of a whole W is to a moment y of W.13 The likely hidden premise in this train of thought 
is the following: since something is an object if and only if an intentional experience 
exists, then the intentional experience and the object are moments of a whole W. But 
such an inference is simply wrong. In this regard, it is important not to treat as equiv-
alent a correlation with a relationship between parts: the intending subject and the object 
are correlatives (the one is not thinkable without the other), but what is designated by 
‘intending subject’ is not related to what is designated by ‘object’ as a part x of a whole 
W is to a part y of W. Father and son are correlatives, but hardly anyone would say that 
the first is to the second as a part x of a whole W is to a part y of W. It is no accident 
that Husserl explicitly denies [M3]: as he writes in his lecture course from 1915, Aus-
gewählte phänomenologische Probleme, the intentional experience and the object are with-
out any connection (Zusammenhang); consequently, they do not together form a 
whole.14 Since [M3] says something general―that is, something which concerns the no-
tion of ‘part’ as such―and since Husserl denies [M3], it follows that the concept of ‘foun-
dation’ cannot be applied to the case of intentional relation. In other words, between 
intentional experience and object there subsists neither a bilateral foundation (x is 
founded on y and y is founded on x) nor a unilateral foundation (x is founded on x even 
if y is not founded on x). All this means that truths such as ‘Every intentional experi-
ence has an object’ or ‘Something is an object if and only if an intentional experience 
exists’ do not imply [M3]. 
 
5   The problem of non-existents 
 
By focusing on the relationship between intentionality and existence, Bolzano’s issue 
makes intricate intentionality itself: indeed, the fact that we can intend something 
which does not exist―in Bolzanian terms, the fact that some presentations are objectless 





Süßbauer (1995) and Künne (2011) this is also Husserl’s view. They ground their read-
ing on Intentionale Gegenstände, the above-mentioned essay written in 1894. In support 
of their exegesis they cite the following statement: “The being of a relation (Relation) 
entails the being of the members of the relation.”15 However, both Süßbauer (1995, 
passim) and Künne (2011, p. 89) contend that their reading is valid with regard to Log-
ical Investigations as well. It is clear therefore that they assume that the German terms 
Relation and Beziehung are equivalent. In this regard one could object that the term 
Relation is much more loaded than Beziehung, and so they are not fully interchangeable. 
This is not the objection I am going to raise: indeed, from some passages of Investiga-
tions it emerges clearly that Relation is just the Latin loanword which in scientific con-
texts replaces Beziehung. For example, when Husserl states that the expression ‘colour’ 
is not a relative (relativer) term, he clarifies this point by claiming that the expression at 
issue does not involve the presentation of a relation (Beziehung) to something else. The 
notion of ‘object’ itself is defined as a relative (relative) one exactly because ‘being an 
object’ means that an intentional relation (Beziehung) exists, since the object is one of the 
members of the intentional correlation (Korrelation). Thus, although Husserl never uses 
the term Relation in the context of intentionality―in which we find only the above-
mentioned terms―it can be stated that in Logical Investigations, Relation and Beziehung 
relate to each other in a way analogous to Intuition and Anschauung. 
However, I believe that the statement which appears in the 1894 essay does not re-
flect Husserl’s more mature account. Specifically, I believe that in the 5th LI, especially 
in the context of the discussion of intentionality, such a claim is not at work. In this 
regard, it is not by chance that Husserl himself in the following years expressed several 
reservations about his own essay (see Heffernan 2015, p. 82 fn 32 and p. 83 fn 35). Thus, 
contrary to what I will call the Süßbauer-Künne reading, I argue that the account de-
veloped in Logical Investigations and in other early writings implies not only [H1], but 
also [H2] and [H3]. In other words, I will argue that these three theses capture the core 
of Husserl’s early theory of intentionality. 
Süßbauer’s argument can be reconstructed as a reductio ad absurdum. Let A be an act 
which has a non-existent object: 
  
(P1)   If A is intentional, then a relation between A and its object O exists.                          
(P2)   Necessarily, A is intentional. 
(P3)   If a relation between A and O exists, then A exists and O exists. 
(P4)   O does not exist. 





(C2)  A is not intentional. [from P1, P3, P4 and C1] 
(C3)  Not necessarily, A is intentional. [from C2]16 
 
Here (P3) is an application of the (alleged) law according to which the existence of a 
relation entails the existence of the relata, and the modal ‘necessarily’ in (P2) can be 
replaced by a more Husserlian ‘essentially’. As we can see, a contradiction arises be-
tween (P2) and (C3), and thus (P1) is false by reductio. Süßbauer (1995, p. 123) argues 
that the way round proposed by Husserl is to reject (P1) and to distinguish between 
‘intentionality’ and ‘relation to an object’ (gegenständliche Beziehung): intentionality will 
then be a property of some experiences, whereas the relation to an object will be a 
relation between an act and an object. According to Süßbauer, Husserl does not claim 
[H2], but only [H1]: it is contingent that a relation between an act and an object obtains, 
that is, it obtains only in those possible worlds in which the object exists. Besides point-
ing out the fact that saying that the intentional relation obtains between an act and an 
object would be imprecise (for it obtains rather between a subject and an object; see 
(A')), I contend that Süßbauer’s argument collapses under Husserl’s scrutiny: for as I 
will show, Husserl would refuse to subscribe to one of the premises. 
Künne in his turn raises the following (clearly rhetorical) question: is every presen-
tation an intentional experience?17 Alternatively: do we direct ourselves to something 
through every presentation? Künne’s answer is no: only those presentations which are 
not objectless (i.e. which have objects that do exist) are intentional experiences. More 
precisely, according to Künne’s hypothesis we will have the following: if A is an ob-
jectless presentation, then A is not an intentional experience. Husserl would deny 
Künne’s view: for according to him, every presentation is an intentional experience (by 
definition), and hence the so-called ‘objectless’ presentations are also intentional expe-
riences. As I will show, an objectless presentation is just an intentional experience 
which does have an object (see also (iii+)), but one that does not exist. 
Let us now look at Husserl’s texts. Recall that I want to argue that both [H2] (inten-
tionality entails a relation) and [H3] (intentionality does not depend upon veridicality) 
express something Husserlian. In the 1898 treatise18 and in the appendix to the 5th LI,19 
Husserl criticizes the so-called theory of immanent objects. Such a theory was develo-
ped by Kazimierz Twardowski in Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung 
(1894). Husserl’s critique of the notion of ‘immanent object’ is basically the same as 
what we find in §90 of Ideas I (see Husserl 1913, pp. 206–209: Der ‘noematische Sinn’ und 
die Unterscheidung von ‘immanenten’ und ‘wirklichen Objekten’) and can be summed up 





 If we intend something which is transcendent (say, T), then T―and not an al-
leged immanent “copy” of T which as such is distinct from T―is the object of 
our experience. 
 If we intend something which exists (say, X), then X―and not an alleged imma-
nent “copy” of X which as such is distinct from X―is the object of our experi-
ence. 
 If we intend something which does not exist (say, Y), then Y―and not an alleged 
immanent “copy” of Y which as such is distinct from Y―is the object of our 
experience. 
 
Here ‘distinct’ entails numerical distinguishability. Using my example, if we perceive 
a laptop (T), then the laptop―and not an alleged immanent “copy” of the laptop which 
as such is distinct from the laptop―is the object of our experience. The alleged imma-
nent “copy” of the laptop is what the immanentist terms ‘the perceived laptop’ or ‘the 
laptop as perceived’ (which Twardowski conceived of as a sort of picture). Husserl is 
willing to distinguish between the perceived laptop (or the laptop as perceived) and the 
laptop itself only on the conceptual (begrifflich) level (and hence not on the ontological 
level). By the first expression he means the laptop as it is given in outer perception: this 
implies among other things that some of its profiles are hidden. By the second expres-
sion he means the laptop as it is, regardless of how it is given in outer perception; for 
example, even though the laptop can appear to us visually as grey (because of the sun-
light, say), it is actually black. What is worth noting is that in both cases we are speaking 
of the same thing (T), just from different conceptual perspectives. This is why Husserl 
can say that the perceived laptop is real if and only if the laptop itself is real. Nor does 
speaking of an immanent “copy” make sense in the case contemplated in the last con-
ditional: it is true not only that there is not a round square (which as we know is a 
stylistic variant of ‘A round square does not exist’), but also that, if we intend a round 
square, there is no round square (hence, there is not even an immanent round square). 
All that we can say is that a round square (which is something transcendent) is pre-
sented, that is, it is an object. This is why with regard to non-veridical intentional ex-
periences Husserl refuses to speak of ‘merely intentional objects’. 
Besides Husserl’s remarks, I think that the immanentist approach encounters two 
other problems. The first is closely connected with the notion of ‘object’: if ‘object’ des-
ignates the target of our experience, then speaking of an immanent object distinct from 





have two targets, or that we are able to have two intentional experiences at the same 
time. Both theses seem to me to be highly disputable. The first one is simply false: if 
through an intentional experience E we direct ourselves to the laptop itself, say T, and T 
is distinct from the immanent laptop, say T', then through E we cannot direct ourselves 
to T'. After all, an intentional experience is defined by its object (an experience E is what 
it is because it is an experience of x). The second solution is less easily refuted. Nothing 
seems to lead us to state that if at instant t we have an intentional experience E, then at 
t we cannot have an intentional experience E': indeed, we can have an intentional ex-
perience against a background of other contemporaneous intentional experiences. This 
is exactly what happens in outer perception: for example, when we see (explicitly) the 
laptop (intentional experience E at t), we see (implicitly) the table on which it is (inten-
tional experience E' at t). So the immanentist could apply this schema to the immanent 
object. Still, it seems to me that this sort of solution would be descriptively unsound in 
the case at hand. 
However, the immanentist could deny such an interpretation; he could reply that 
the only target of our experience is what he calls the ‘immanent object’―in my exam-
ple, the immanent laptop. But then the second problem arises: if the immanent laptop 
is the only object of our experience, then how can we clarify our access (namely, our 
relation) to the transcendent laptop? More generally, what allows us to talk about 
transcendent laptops, if our experience does in fact not reach them? 
Let us now return to Husserl’s conception. It can be observed that the last two 
conditionals entail two analytic propositions: 
 
 If X exists and X is intended through an experience E, then the object of E exists. 
 If Y does not exist and Y is intended through an experience E, then the object of 
E does not exist. 
 
The first conclusion that can be derived is that Husserl’s notion of ‘object’ is existentially 
neutral (see Heffernan 2015, p. 80): not all that is intended exists, that is, not every object 
is existent. 
The second text I would like to look at is the lecture course from 1906, Einleitung in 
die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Husserl writes: 
  
We have countless intuitive and conceptual thought acts that are objectless. Object-
less, insofar as the objects that are presented and thought do not exist at all. And 





in hallucination an object stands “before our eyes”. Acts refer to things (Sachen) […] 
in any case.20 (my emphasis) 
 
Here Husserl is referring to two notorious cases which are also cited in the appendix 
to the 5th LI: the presentation of a round square (something that necessarily does not 
exist, that is, which necessarily is neither real nor possible) and the hallucination of a 
physical thing (something that is contingently real but necessarily possible). What is in-
teresting in the quoted passage is not that Husserl concedes that there is a sense in 
which a presentation can be said to be ‘objectless’ (after all, the term is ambiguous and 
it is not originally Husserlian, but rather Bolzanian), but that Husserl stresses the point 
that a presentation cannot be said to be ‘objectless’ precisely because intentionality en-
tails a relation between an act and an object. In this context it is worth noting that ac-
cording to Husserl ‘to perceive’ is not a factive verb: ‘S perceives X’ does not entail that 
S’s perception is veridical (which in turn would entail that X is real); rather, it means 
just ‘X is given to S in the flesh (leibhaftig)’ (see Husserl 1907, p. 15); hence, in Husserl’s 
framework a hallucination of X is a non-veridical perception of X. 
Related considerations lie behind what we read in the second book of Ideas, where 
it is stated that an intentional relation exists even if the object does not exist. More 
precisely, with regard to transcendent perception Husserl distinguishes between the 
intentionale Beziehung and the reale Beziehung.21 For the first to obtain, it is sufficient that 
something be perceived; for the second to obtain, it is necessary that what is perceived 
be real. We should bear in mind that Husserl uses the adjective real, which in his frame-
work is not the same as wirklich. By calling the second relation real he does not want to 
say that the first one is unreal (unwirklich). Rather, he means just what follows: when 
we perceive a real laptop, this latter propagates through space in waves that strike our 
sense organs (e.g., our optic nerves, if the perception is a visual one). Husserl points 
out that all this is a psychophysical fact, and this is why he calls the real relation also the 
real-causal relation: this latter “runs ‘parallel’” to the intentional relation, which obtains 
even when we perceive an unreal laptop (i.e. when we hallucinate a laptop). 
The second conclusion that can be derived is that with regard to Husserl’s account 
we can speak of the existence-independence of the intentional relation (see Smith and 
McIntyre 1982, p. 11). That is, that an intentional relation between x and y obtains does 
not entail that x exists and y exists. So as for Süßbauer’s argument, I can conclude that 
Husserl would not deny (P1), but rather (P3): he would agree that the existence of a 
relation entails the relata (or arguments), but he would not agree that the existence of 





At this stage, some explanation of the Husserlian notion of ‘existence’ is required. 
An account that allows us (as Husserl’s does) to speak of ‘existent objects’ and ‘non-
existent objects’ does not imply that existence is an mereological property. Here the 
grammatical form might be misleading: since in English both ‘existent’ and ‘green’ are 
adjectives, one might put an expression like ‘existent object’ on the same level as ex-
pressions like ‘green leaf’. Yet as is noted in Intentionale Gegenstände, though ‘existence’ 
seems to express a predicate among others, in fact it does not, for it expresses rather 
what may be called a condition―the one of ‘validity’, Husserl there specifies.22 This is 
also why we should be more careful in translating: Husserl uses existierend, which in 
German is primarily a form of a verb (a present participle to be precise), though it is 
also an adjective; accordingly, we should rather speak of ‘existing’ (and ‘non-existing’) 
objects. This way of speaking prevents us from conceiving of existence as an M-prop-
erty: indeed, as Husserl clearly states in the 3rd LI, ‘existent’, unlike ‘red’ and ‘round’, 
does not designate a part of the object (hence, according to the given definitions, I can-
not say that existence is really in the object, nor can I say that the object really has 
existence).23 If existence were a part of the object, we could intend existence, or more 
specifically, we could perceive existence (implicitly in a partial intention and explicitly 
in a particular perception)―but this is phenomenologically unsound; for example, we 
can see the leaf (or its colour), but we cannot see its reality. Difficulties would arise on 
the ontological side as well: if it were true that the existence of the whole entails the 
existence of (all of) its parts, then the existence of the leaf would entail the existence of 
the existence of the leaf―and this is counterintuitive. 
Furthermore, in such a framework the classical logical principle of existential intro-
duction (Fa → ∃x(Fx)) fails. Consider a round square, that is, a square which instantiates 
the property ‘round’ (just as a green square is a square which instantiates the property 
‘green’). In first-order predicate calculus we could write it as Fa ∧ Ga, and so derive 
∃x(Fx ∧ Gx). Now, Husserl would say that a round square is an impossible whole 
(‘round’ and ‘square’ being incompatible (unverträglich)), that is, something which does 
not exist (possibility being the minimal sense in which something can exist). 
In conclusion, Bolzano’s issue―as Husserl himself formulates it in Intentionale Ge-
genstände (see Husserl 1894, p. 303)―can be solved by the Husserl of the Investigations 
by means of the conjunction of two statements which do not contradict each other: 







6   Non-relational accounts 
 
I have shown that the Süßbauer-Künne (henceforth SK) reading is exegetically untena-
ble. In this section I will show that it is flawed as a phenomenological account of inten-
tionality. In other words, I will argue that Husserl’s account is better in terms of what 
has been called ‘phenomenal adequacy’ (Meixner 2006). 
It is tempting to say that every non-relational account faces what might be called the 
access problem: if intentionality does not entail a relation (negation of [H2]), and if what 
we term ‘act’ or ‘intentional experience’ cannot be reduced to what we term (for exam-
ple) ‘green leaf’ (that is, if act and object are not identical), then how can we clarify our 
access (namely, our relation) to what we term ‘green leaf’? I believe that SK can avoid 
the access problem in the following way. Consider the case of perception; SK might 
formulate the following thesis: 
 
(SK+) If a perception P is veridical, then a relation between P and its object exists. 
 
Where the antecedent of (SK+) entails ‘The object of the perception P is real.’ To put it 
differently, SK might make relationality dependent upon veridicality (this is in fact the 
solution adopted by Kriegel (2008)): 
 
(SK+) If a perception P is veridical, then a relation between P and its object exists. 
(SK~) If a perception P is non-veridical, then a relation between P and its object does not 
exist. 
 
As I have shown, Husserl’s account is quite different: 
 
(H+) If a perception P is veridical, then the object of P is real. 
(H~) If a perception P is non-veridical, then the object of P is not real. 
 
Where both the antecedent in (H+) and the antecedent in (H~) entail ‘A(n intentional) 
relation exists.’  
Before going back to SK, I would like to compare Husserl’s theory with three alter-







RELATIONAL ACCOUNT. In my previous schema I conceived of ‘Paris intends a leaf’ as a 
(dyadic) relation I which obtains between Paris and the leaf, in that order. Let the in-
tending subject be denoted by p (Paris) and let the object be denoted by l (the leaf). 
Thus, we have a binary predication which can be written either as I(p,l) (if we opt for 
the notation R(x,y)) or as pIl (if we opt for the (Russellian) notation xRy). This is the 
logical description which corresponds to a relational account of intentionality. I believe 
that such an account is the one that best captures Husserl’s theory. 
 
ADVERBIAL ACCOUNT. An adverbialist attempts to capture the nature of intentionality 
by rephrasing the proposition ‘S intends X’ as ‘S intends X-ly.’ Using my example, 
‘Paris intends a leaf’ becomes ‘Paris intends leafly.’ The proposition thus acquires the 
form of a monadic predication, where the unary predicate is obtained from an adver-
bial modification of the derelativization I* of I. Hence the logical form is ([l](I))(p). A 
phenomenological objection to this account can be formulated as follows: a thing as 
such cannot be described as a way, and the same must be said with respect to ideal 
objects like numbers, concepts, etc. Perhaps Husserl would say that an adverb gener-
ated by adding the suffix ‘-ly’ can express what he terms ‘apprehensional form’ or 
‘apprehensional way’ (Auffassungsform/Auffassungsweise; see Husserl 1901, p. 624), 
which determines, for example, whether an intentional experience is perceptual or im-
aginative. So we may say, for example, ‘S intends X perceptually’ or ‘S intends X imagi-
natively.’ Husserl would probably consider a phrase like ‘leaf-ly’ as a mere façon de 
parler. 
 
PARAMETRIC ACCOUNT. The parametric account follows a similar path: here ‘S intends 
X’ is rephrased as ‘S has the property of X-intending.’ Again, using my example, ‘Paris 
intends a leaf’ becomes ‘Paris has the property of leaf-intending.’ In this case too, the 
proposition acquires the form of a monadic predication, where the unary predicate is 
obtained from the parametrization of the dyadic relation I by the noun l; the logical 
form is thus Il(p). The phenomenological objection this account results in can be for-
mulated as follows: trivially, since the parametric account is not a relational account, it 
cannot be said that ‘leaf-intending’ expresses an R-property, and so it must express an-
other sort of property. I contend only that ‘leaf-intending’ cannot express an M-prop-
erty. In this sense, Paris can have, for example, the property white, but not the alleged 
property leaf-intending. I have not decided whether intentionality is an M-property of 





to leave open the question whether intentionality is an M-property of a subject, since I 
believe it is surely not. 
 
However, both an adverbialist and a parametrist can hold SK; in other words, both can 
make relationality dependent upon veridicality. But an account that adopts this posi-
tion would not be a phenomenological account: phenomenally speaking, the intentional 
relation is not something that depends upon the existence of the object (hence, it is not 
contingent that an intentional relation exists if an intentional experience exists), for ‘re-
lation’ captures only our stance, which is a stance towards something. This is what re-
flection shows us: the stance at issue is the same in both veridical and non-veridical in-
tentional experiences. The case of hallucination is instructive: we must describe non-
veridical perceptions as a relation to something (“In hallucination an object stands ‘be-
fore our eyes’.”). In the words of Aristotle (Met. Δ.15, 1020b26–1021b11), intentionality 
as such entails a πρός τι. 
 
7   Conclusion 
 
Let me briefly summarize my results. From the exegetical point of view, I believe I have 
shown that there is no reason to read Husserl’s early theory of intentionality as a non-
relational one; indeed, from the texts I have examined, it emerges clearly that according 
to Husserl, in describing intentionality the concept of relation turns out to be unavoid-
able. From the systematic point of view, I believe I have presented a consistent theory of 
intentionality. I believe that this is due in particular to Husserl’s notions of object and 
existence, which are more sophisticated than many contemporary ones. I also believe 
that Husserl’s early theory of intentionality is the best candidate for a unified theory of 
intentionality, that is, a theory that provides a clarification of all cases in which we refer 
to something through presentation. 
 
Notes 
1 I translate Erlebnis as ‘experience’, though what this English word properly fits is Erfahrung, which in 
Husserl’s framework is not coterminous with Erlebnis: indeed, some Erlebnisse are not Erfahrungen (e.g., 
phantasies).  
2 See Husserl (1901, p. 392): “Das determinierende Beiwort intentional nennt den gemeinsamen Wesen-
scharakter der abzugrenzenden Erlebnisklasse, die Eigenheit der Intention, das sich in der Weise der 







3 See Husserl (1901, pp. 385–386): “Wird sich die Rede von einer Beziehung hier nicht vermeiden lassen. 
[…] Die intentionalen Erlebnisse haben das Eigentümliche, sich auf vorgestellte Gegenstände in ver-
schiedener Weise zu beziehen. Das tun sie eben im Sinne der Intention.” 
4 See Husserl (1898, p. 130): “In dem Letzteren ist Inhalt ein wenig passendes Wort für Gegenstand, 
denn es betrifft das mir in der Wahrnehmung Gegenüberstehende, das von mir wahrnehmend, d. h. als 
daseiend Gemeinte (Intendierte).” 
5 See Husserl (1908, p. 39): “Jede Vorstellung soll einen Gegenstand haben, sich auf einen Gegenstand 
beziehen, gleichgültig, ob Überzeugung mitbesteht oder nicht besteht, und gleichgültig, ob die Über-
zeugung richtig ist oder nicht.” 
6 See Husserl (1901, p. 386): “Ein Gegenstand ist in ihnen ‘gemeint’ auf ihn ist ‘abgezielt’, und zwar in 
der Weise der Vorstellung oder zugleich der Beurteilung usw. Darin liegt aber nichts anderes, als daß 
eben gewisse Erlebnisse präsent sind, welche einen Charakter der Intention haben und speziell der vor-
stellenden, urteilenden, begehrenden Intention usw. Es sind (von gewissen Ausnahmefällen sehen wir 
hier ab) nicht zwei Sachen erlebnismäßig präsent, es ist nicht der Gegenstand erlebt und daneben das 
intentionale Erlebnis, das sich auf ihn richtet; es sind auch nicht zwei Sachen in dem Sinne, wie Teil und 
umfassenderes Ganzes, sondern nur Eines ist präsent, das intentionale Erlebnis, dessen wesentlicher 
deskriptiver Charakter eben die bezügliche Intention ist. […] Ist dieses Erlebnis präsent, so ist eo ipso, 
das liegt, betone ich, an seinem eigenen Wesen, die intentionale ‘Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand’ voll-
zogen, eo ipso ist ein Gegenstand ‘intentional gegenwärtig’; denn das eine und andere besagt genau 
dasselbe. Und natürlich kann solch ein Erlebnis im Bewußtsein vorhanden sein mit dieser seiner 
Intention, ohne daß der Gegenstand überhaupt existiert und vielleicht gar existieren kann; der Gegen-
stand ist gemeint, d. h. das ihn Meinen ist Erlebnis; aber er ist dann bloß vermeint und in Wahrheit 
nichts. Stelle ich den Gott Jupiter vor, so ist dieser Gott vorgestellter Gegenstand, er ist in meinem Akte 
‘immanent gegenwärtig’, hat in ihm ‘mentale Inexistenz’, und wie die in eigentlicher Interpretation 
verkehrten Redeweisen sonst lauten mögen. Ich stelle den Gott Jupiter vor, das heißt, ich habe ein 
gewisses Vorstellungserlebnis, in meinem Bewußtsein vollzieht sich das den-Gott-Jupiter-Vorstellen. 
Man mag dieses intentionale Erlebnis in deskriptiver Analyse zergliedern, wie man will, so etwas wie 
der [sic] Gott Jupiter kann man darin natürlich nicht finden.” 
7 See Husserl (1894, p. 326): “So weit der Ausdruck ‘Es gibt ein A’ Sinn und Wahrheit beanspruchen 
kann, so weit reicht auch die Domäne des Existenzbegriffs.” 
8 See Husserl (1901, pp. 257 and 404): “Farbe ist nicht ein relativer Ausdruck, dessen Bedeutung die 
Vorstellung einer Beziehung zu anderem einschlösse. Obschon Farbe nicht ohne Farbiges ‘denkbar’ ist, 
so ist doch die Existenz irgendeines Farbigen, näher einer Ausdehnung, nicht im Begriffe Farbe ‘analy-
tisch’ begründet.” “Aber ein Gefallen ist ohne Gefälliges nicht denkbar. Und nicht etwa bloß darum ist 
Gefallen ohne Gefälliges nicht denkbar, weil wir es hier mit korrelativen Ausdrücken zu tun haben; also 
derart, wie wir z. B. sagen, eine Ursache ohne Wirkung, ein Vater ohne Kind sei nicht denkbar: sondern 
weil das spezifische Wesen des Gefallens die Beziehung auf ein Gefallendes fordert.” 
9 I should point out that the examples of correlatives given in the 3rd LI contain instances of ‘there is’ 






formulations are imprecise, or at least do not do justice to the account of intentionality developed in the 
subsequent Investigations. 
10 See Husserl (1901, p. 616): “Die Bezeichnung dieser Bestandstücke als Füllen ist eben eine relative, 
funktionelle, sie drückt eine Charakteristik aus, die dem Inhalt durch den Akt und durch die Rolle die-
ses Aktes in möglichen Erfüllungssynthesen zuwächst. Es verhält sich hier ähnlich wie bei der Bezeich-
nung ‘Gegenstand’. Gegenstand zu sein ist kein positives Merkmal, keine positive Art eines Inhalts, es 
bezeichnet den Inhalt nur als intentionales Korrelat einer Vorstellung.” Note that this account of the 
designation ‘object’ supports my reading of the proposition ‘Every intentional experience has an object’ 
as an analytic one; what Husserl denies is that the expression ‘colour’ is a relative one. 
11 With regard to reflection, the early Husserl holds true two theses; first, if we reflect on something, say 
X, we live through both the reflection on X and X itself (see, e.g., Husserl 1904, p. 19); and secondly, the 
object of a reflection is to this latter as a part is to its whole (see, e.g., Husserl 1909, p. 115). I believe that 
both theses are highly problematic, but this would be the topic of another paper. 
12 See Husserl (1904, p. 13): “Haben wir zweierlei im Akt: die Wahrnehmung und den Gegenstand? 
Nein. Der Gegenstand braucht nicht zu existieren. Viele Wahrnehmungen und ein Objekt.” 
13 Heffernan puts forward this view. I would like to emphasize that apart from this point, my reading 
of Husserl’s early theory of intentionality is substantially in agreement with the one defended by Hef-
fernan (2015).  
14 See Husserl (1915, p. 103): “Der reelle Wesensbestand des Bewusstseins und der reelle Wesensbestand 
des intentionalen Objekts sind aber nach dieser Analyse außer allem Zusammenhang. Die Beziehung, 
die das Bewusstsein wesensmäßig auf sein intentionales Objekt nach allen intentionalen Momenten hat, 
ist nicht eine Einheit im Sinn eines reellen Ganzen, wobei die Momente des Ganzen verbunden sind. 
Verbindung im eigentlichen Sinn fehlt hier, und fehlt hier notwendig. Es ist eine irreale Aufeinander-
Bezogenheit.” 
15 See Husserl (1894, p. 315): “Ähnliches gilt von jeder echten Relationswahrheit; denn das Sein der 
Relation schließt das Sein der Relationsglieder ein.” 
16 See Süßbauer (1995, p. 111): “Nähmen wir an, Intentionalität wäre eine Beziehung zwischen einem 
Akt und einem davon verschiedenen Gegenstand, so könnte […] die Intentionalität allen Akten nicht 
wesensnotwendig zukommen, denn, wäre die Intentionalität eine Beziehung, so hiesse dies beispiels-
weis für das Vorstellen von Bill Clinton, dass in jeder möglichen Situation (möglichen Welt) ein solcher 
Vorstellungsakt in intentionaler Beziehung zu Bill Clinton stünde, und da nach Husserl das Bestehen 
einer Relation die Existenz der Relata impliziert, folgte daraus, dass ein solcher Vorstellungsakt nur in 
solchen möglichen Welten intentional sein kann, in welchen auch Bill Clinton existiert, was hiesse, dass 
die Intentionalität der Akte von der zufälligen (kontingenten) Existenz des Gegenstandes abhinge.” 
17 See Künne (2011, p. 85): “Aber gilt jetzt wirklich noch, dass jedes Vorstellen ein ‘intentionales Erlebnis’ 
ist, dass jedes Vorstellen den Charakter hat, auf etwas ‘gerichtet’ zu sein? Trifft das nicht nur auf dasje-






18 See Husserl (1898, pp. 133–134): “Angenommen es sei das wahrgenommene Haus in Wirklichkeit 
nicht, es sei meine Wahrnehmung bloße Halluzination―was ist dann wirklich? Der ‘immanente’ Ge-
genstand? Das ‘erscheinende Haus als solches’? Aber das erscheinende Haus ist ja, wie festgestellt, iden-
tisch mit dem wirklichen. […] Wenn das wahrgenommene Haus als solches existiert, so existiert eben 
das Haus als wahrgenommen, und einen anderen Sinn kann der Ausdruck nicht haben, wenn wir ihn 
ernst und eigentlich nehmen. Das intentionale Haus ist das, worauf die Intention geht, es ist das Haus, 
das und so wie es in der Wahrnehmung dasteht. Existiert es, so existiert eben dieses Haus hier. Existiert 
es nicht, nun dann existiert zwar meine Intention, näher mein Dies-Haus-Wahrnehmen, aber nicht das 
intentionale Haus, welches nichts anderes als das Haus selbst ist. Unterscheide ich doch das Haus selbst 
von dem wahrgenommenen Haus oder von dem Haus, so wie ich es wahrnehme, so mache ich mir im 
begrifflichen Denken klar, dass von dem Haus nicht alle Teile und Seiten selbst in dieWahrnehmung 
fallen.” 
19 See Husserl (1901, pp. 438–440): “Es ist ein schwerer Irrtum, wenn man überhaupt einen reellen Un-
terschied zwischen den ‘bloß immanenten’ oder ‘intentionalen’ Gegenständen auf der einen und ihnen 
ev. entsprechenden ‘wirklichen’ und ‘transzendenten’ Gegenständen auf der anderen Seite macht. […] 
Man braucht es nur auszusprechen, und jedermann muß es anerkennen: daß der intentionale Gegen-
stand der Vorstellung derselbe ist wie ihr wirklicher und gegebenenfalls ihr äußerer Gegenstand, und 
daß es widersinnig ist, zwischen beiden zu unterscheiden. Der transzendente Gegenstand wäre gar nicht 
Gegenstand dieser Vorstellung, wenn er nicht ihr intentionaler Gegenstand wäre. Und selbstverständ-
lich ist das ein bloßer analytischer Satz. Der Gegenstand der Vorstellung, der ‘Intention’, das ist und 
besagt der vorgestellte, der intentionale Gegenstand. Stelle ich Gott oder einen Engel, ein intelligibles 
Sein an sich oder ein physisches Ding oder ein rundes Viereck usw. vor, so ist dieses hier Genannte und 
Transzendente eben gemeint, also (nur mit anderem Worte) intentionales Objekt; dabei ist es gleichgül-
tig, ob dieses Objekt existiert, ob es fingiert oder absurd ist. Der Gegenstand ist ein ‘bloß intentionaler’, 
heißt natürlich nicht: er existiert, jedoch nur in der intentio (somit als ihr reelles Bestandstück), oder es 
existiert darin irgendein Schatten von ihm; sondern es heißt: die Intention, das einen so beschaffenen 
Gegenstand ‘Meinen’ existiert, aber nicht der Gegenstand. Existiert andererseits der intentionale Ge-
genstand, so existiert nicht bloß die Intention, das Meinen, sondern auch das Gemeinte.” 
20 See Husserl (1906, p. 153): “Und so haben wir unzählige intuitive und konzeptive Denkakte, die ge-
genstandslos sind. Gegenstandslos, sofern die Gegenstände, die da vorgestellt und gedacht sind, gar 
nicht sind. Und doch nicht gegenstandslos, sofern in allen ein Gegenstandsbewußtsein vorliegt: In der 
Halluzination steht uns ein Gegenstand ‘vor Augen’, im falschen Urteil ist ein gedanklicher Sachverhalt 
geglaubt. Auf Sachen beziehen sich also die Akte, die wir Denkakte nennen, in jedem Fall.” 
21 See Husserl (1912, p. 215): “Also, es ist ein Unterschied: 1. diese intentionale Beziehung: ich habe das 
Objekt gegeben, ich habe es gegeben als so und so erscheinend. […] 2. die reale Beziehung: das Objekt 
D steht in real-kausaler Beziehung zu mir, zum Ich-Mensch, also zunächst zu dem Leib, der mein Leib 
heißt etc. Die reale Beziehung fällt weg, wenn das Ding nicht existiert: die intentionale Beziehung bleibt 
bestehen. Daß jedesmal, wenn das Objekt existiert, der intentionalen Beziehung eine reale ‘parallel’ 
läuft, nämlich daß dann vom Objekte (der realen Wirklichkeit) Schwingungen im Raume sich verbrei-







22 See Husserl (1894, p. 341): “Existenz ist nur scheinbar ein Prädikat des nach der grammatischen Form 
sich darbietenden Subjekts; es drückt vielmehr aus, daß der Subjektvorstellung des grammatischen 
Existentialsatzes das Prädikat der Geltung zukomme.” 
23 See Husserl (1901, pp. 231 and 666): “Den Begriff Teil fassen wir in dem weitesten Sinne, der es ge-
stattet, alles und jedes Teil zu nennen, was ‘in’ einem Gegenstande unterscheidbar oder, objektiv zu 
reden, in ihm ‘vorhanden’ ist. Teil ist alles, was der Gegenstand im ‘realen’, oder besser reellen Sinne 
‘hat’, im Sinne eines ihn wirklich Aufbauenden, und zwar der Gegenstand an und für sich, also unter 
Abstraktion von allen Zusammenhängen, in die er eingewoben ist. Danach weist jedes nicht bezügliche 
‘reale’ Prädikat auf einen Teil des Subjektgegenständes hin. So z. B. rot und rund, nicht aber existierend 
oder etwas.” “Das Sein ist nichts im Gegenstande, kein Teil desselben.” 
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